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Abstract—As the requirement for companies and individuals to 
protect information and personal details comes more into 
focus, the implementation of security that goes beyond the 
ubiquitous password or Personal Identification Number (PIN) 
is paramount. With the ever growing number of us utilizing 
more than one device simultaneously, the problem and need is 
compounded. This paper proposes a novel approach to security 
that leverages the collective confidence of user identity held by 
the multiplicity of devices present at any given time. User 
identity confidence is reinforced by sharing established 
credentials between devices, enabling them to make informed 
judgments on their own security position. An Adaptive 
Security Control Engine (ASCE) is outlined, illustrating how 
an environment sensitive and adaptive security envelope can be 
established and maintained around an individual. 
Keywords- authentication, identification, mobile, security, 
biometric, identity 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The aspiration of people to be mobile and yet remain in 
communication with colleagues, family and friends has 
driven the use of devices that support and complement this 
lifestyle. Estimates suggest that worldwide Wi-Fi hotspot 
usage during 2009 increased to 1.2 billion connections, an 
increase of 47% from 2008, with this being driven by a 50% 
increase in the sale of Wi-Fi capable handsets between 2007 
and 2008 [1]. Technological evolution has enabled powerful 
and sophisticated systems to be accommodated into these 
handheld electronic gadgets furnishing them with extensive 
storage and processing capabilities, making them an 
increasing target for thieves. In 2007-8 over 700,000 
handsets were stolen in the UK, with 50% of all robberies 
targeting a mobile phone in the items taken and in 33% of 
those offences it was the only stolen possession [2]. Between 
May and June 2009 alone, the UK saw an 11% increase in 
the reporting of missing/stolen mobile phones, with 84% of 
theft victims failing to retrieve their lost handsets [3].  
However, theft is not the sole reason for concern; a New 
York survey revealed that during a six month period in 2008, 
31,544 phones and 2,752 other types of handheld device 
(laptops, PDAs, memory sticks etc.) were simply left in the 
city’s Yellow Cabs, an average of more than two per cab [4]. 
In this climate, the requirement to protect and secure the 
potentially large volumes of sensitive and personal 
information contained within these desirable pieces of 
equipment is imperative and even acknowledged and 
supported by Government [5],[6]. 
The problem is magnified because users are finding 
themselves in possession of an ever growing number of 
digital devices, each one having its own associated security 
requirements. With several being carried concurrently, at the 
moment of initial use it is likely that similar procedures of 
authentication are undertaken repeatedly across the disparate 
entities to ensure full activation. This repetitive and time-
consuming operation raises the question of whether there is a 
better way and does the collective identity knowledge 
possessed by the multiplicity of secured devices utilized by 
an individual at any given time present an opportunity to 
improve security. As each device is activated a set of 
authentication credentials are determined and access is either 
granted or denied. By enabling the individual and distinct 
devices to communicate their own authentication status and 
to share established user identity confidence it may be 
possible to synthesize an enhanced form of security. 
This paper explores this concept and proposes an 
approach through which authentication credentials can be 
distributed amongst devices and how this information can be 
used to create a novel method of security and user control. It 
addresses the requirements to produce a flexible, adaptive 
and non-intrusive security mechanism that will meet future 
demands and provide a foundation for further development. 
Firstly, the background explores the current methods of 
securing mobile devices and the associated weaknesses. 
Once these foundations have been laid the paper continues to 
outline the new proposals and considers how they will 
improve upon the situation at present. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Security is founded on three key principles – something 
an individual knows, they possess or they are [7]. 
Knowledge and possession based security both rely upon the 
inherently weak link in the chain – the user. The first utilizes 
a piece of significant or memorable information which is 
often forgotten or written down [8]; the second, the 
presentation of a physical key or token at the required 
moment. Forgetting, mislaying or losing the crucial item or 
information will bar further access attempts.  
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The ubiquitous point of entry user identity code/password 
has been rendered susceptible to abuse through the inability 
or unwillingness of individuals to protect and administer this 
sensitive information correctly [9]. To maintain security it is 
supposedly known or more precisely memorized exclusively 
by the creator [10] but is too often shared or inadvertently 
communicated [11]. Although different; identification and 
authentication both rely upon the recognition of the identity 
of a user interacting with a device at any given moment. 
Hand held mobile devices typically assume the identity of 
the user and utilize personal identification numbers (PINs) to 
authenticate 1  this at point-of-entry. The authentication is 
Boolean; the subject is either deemed to be whom they 
purport to be or they are not, without any middle ground. 
Frequently passing the one-off process will permit 
unregulated access to all facilities and utilities installed on 
the device [12]. Therefore once access has been gained the 
ability to incur large telephone bills or excessive high-cost 
data downloads is readily available to impostors who 
compromise the PIN.  
In the search for evermore appropriate and robust 
authentication, attention has turned to biometrics (something 
the user is) to establish methods that cannot easily be 
compromised, are non-intrusive and equally eliminate the 
potential threat posed by social engineering [13]. A finer 
granularity of identification can be achieved; ultimately the 
device will either issue or refuse access to the user, however 
the starting confidence can precisely reflect how well the 
supplied identity matches the known template sample. 
Having this ability will allow a device to tailor its reaction to 
strong and weak authentication attempts accordingly. 
Further, without fundamentally changing the habits to which 
users are accustomed improvements can be implemented. As 
a supplementary development, layered authentication 
techniques have been explored and employed to compound 
protection and expand the sophistication required to 
circumvent defense mechanisms including; password and 
facial recognition [14], fingerprint scan and tokenized 
random number [15], teeth imaging and voice pattern 
verification [16]. This can then be reinforced by elements 
such as location information which indicates whether or not 
a user is operating in a known and unsurprising locale [17]. 
Currently security that is founded on point of entry 
authentication that remains static for the duration of 
interaction is unable to prevent misuse succeeding a hijack, 
when following a legitimate log-on the piece of equipment is 
illicitly removed or used by another. If this occurs and the 
device is kept active and not switched off, free and open use 
can be maintained for a significant period of time. With 85% 
of owners admitting their mobile phone is on for over 10 
hours per day [9], to counteract this weakness proposals to 
degrade service availability over time have been made 
[13],[14] enabling the device to shut down functionality 
unless re-authentication occurs.  
As several gadgets are frequently carried simultaneously 
any intrinsic security weakness is amplified especially as 
                                                           
1 As opposed to devices such as laptop computers that generally rely on a 
user name and associated password. 
people will often use the same PIN for more than one device, 
if not all of them [9]. Once one is compromised by the 
discovery or disclosure of the PIN then it is possible that all 
the owned devices become vulnerable. 
To circumvent the associated weaknesses of point-of-
entry authentication it would be advantageous to augment 
the process with ongoing reassurances. Establishing user 
identification during the initial sign-on and then 
authenticating at intervals to maintain confidence allows 
opened devices to be secured against potential theft or loss. 
Although a device may be open and fully usable upon 
stealing, without successful re-authentication within a 
limited timeframe it would become inoperable. Ongoing re-
authentication can be either intrusive by interrupting the user 
and requiring a password or PIN to be entered, or non-
intrusive in the case of biometrics where for example the 
user’s identity is confirmed by their typing characteristics 
[18],[19]. If correctly implemented, either will be an 
improvement upon the current situation but it is important to 
consider the most flexible and appropriate approach. 
Section III discusses and then outlines a potential 
framework that addresses these weaknesses and provides a 
means by which mobile device security could be enhanced. 
III. ENHANCING SECURITY FOR MOBILE DEVICES 
With individuals being likely to carry more than one 
portable device and simultaneously interact with, or at least 
be known to, other technology in their local vicinity at any 
given time, possibilities exist to maximize this security 
potential. For instance, in the morning on leaving the house a 
worker might activate their business phone and Personal 
Digital Assistant (PDA) whilst at the same time picking up 
their car keys. By leveraging the relationship the user has 
with these multiple devices and associating the identification 
knowledge that each independently possesses, enhanced 
assurance of the owner’s identity can be determined. At the 
time of authentication, each device establishes a confidence 
in the identity of the user, either true or false. Facilitating a 
means of communicating the current security status between 
the unique entities would allow them to bolster their own 
confidence in the user’s identity. 
Utilizing environmental awareness 2  and enabling the 
devices to request and trade their current authentication 
confidence, would provide a more flexible approach to 
security administration. This self-governing method would 
allow the party devices to adjust their own status through the 
consideration of their peers and the surrounding 
environment. The main drive is to achieve a position where a 
newly activated piece of equipment would not require an 
authentication process to be undertaken because the 
surrounding near vicinity contains sufficient confidence in 
the user’s identity, that it is considered unnecessary to do so. 
Additionally, as the user relocates between areas of differing 
threat (public spaces to a home or work environment), the 
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wireless networks and other such information that provide a means to 
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devices could relay the situation to their counterparts 
allowing each to react accordingly.  
In order for such a system to operate, it is necessary to 
first give some consideration to the underpinning 
requirements: 
A. Biometrics 
Using biometrics fits the requirements of a heightened 
security methodology for mobile devices, on the basis that 
they are characteristics that cannot be forgotten, divulged or 
lost by their owner [20]. Further, biometrics divides into two 
distinct tranches of study, physiological and behavioral [21]. 
The use of physiological biometrics is more often preferred 
for identification purposes because of the greater degree of 
uniqueness, experienced consistency and resilience to 
external corruption [22]. However, it is best suited to point-
of-entry scenarios where an individual would be happy or 
certainly less discontent to tolerate the inconvenience 
necessary to undergo the required process of identification. 
For instance, having to place a hand upon a particular device, 
or head at a specific angle, to enable the relevant scan to be 
taken are both obtrusive procedures. Conversely, behavioral 
biometrics lend themselves to authentication scenarios where 
the identity of the individual is already established and 
confirmation of a user's continuing presence is sought. 
Behavioral traits can be detected unobtrusively enabling 
validation to be carried out imperceptibly to the user [9],[14], 
[18]. Capturing a voice sample during a mobile telephone 
conversation would allow the device to compare extracted 
voice patterns and nuances against a known and expected 
reference vocal template. Executing such a process regularly 
during use, facilitates a means by which the mobile device 
could gain appropriate confidence in the user’s identity 
during extended periods of otherwise unchecked access. 
Although upon first consideration a single layer of 
protection maybe deemed sufficient, [23] observed that 
“Unimodal biometric systems have to contend with a variety 
of problems such as noisy data, intra-class variations, 
restricted degrees of freedom, non-universality, spoof 
attacks, and unacceptable error rates”. With individual 
biometrics failing to meet appropriate levels of acceptance, 
attention has been turned to combining techniques in 
multimodal authentication systems [14],[24]. There are a 
plethora of circumstances where multimodal biometrics are 
advantageous and would be the authentication method of 
choice but not readily available because of technological 
limitations. 
By combining devices and available techniques it may be 
possible to achieve the same objective without multi-layering 
on any individual piece of equipment. Drawing together 
authentication confidence from a number of disparate 
devices would enable any one entity to make stronger and 
more informed judgment calls. With the likelihood that 
distinct devices will utilize different biometric techniques 
with differing rigor and strength, combining the otherwise 
unilateral decisions will further improve the ultimate 
recognition process. An added advantage of this is that 
captured identity samples could be communicated from 
devices without the processing capability to analyze the data, 
to a local entity sufficiently powerful to complete the 
operation. However, if no local device was available but 
network or internet services were, the samples could 
alternatively be passed to a remote authentication system 
where the analysis could be executed and decision returned. 
B.  Security degradation 
It can be argued that rather than remain static, the 
authentication confidence should be eroded over time, 
reducing service and application availability 3  [13]. Upon 
reaching a significant point, re-authentication would be 
necessary to re-determine the user’s credentials and once 
more allocate appropriate confidence. Should this 
undertaking be unsuccessful (as anticipated in the case of a 
hijacking), service provision would degrade to such a degree 
that the entity would be rendered un-usable; protecting the 
information stored within and further misuse.  
Some functions of mobile devices are more sensitive than 
others and their illicit use could potentially incur greater cost 
or harm. Rather than regarding every type of feature equally 
it is sensible to enable a degree of flexibility in how each is 
treated and protected with the introduction of confidence cut-
offs. Operative tasks and applications could be allocated a 
security tariff allowing some functions to be carried out with 
a low confidence whilst at an equal level others would be 
blocked entirely. For instance with low confidence it would 
be acceptable to operate a calculator application but the 
ability to instigate a telephone call would be barred. 
Additionally, the calculator application would not only 
function at a lower tariff but it could be allowed a slower rate 
of degradation implying that it would take longer for it to 
reach the cutoff point of inoperability [20]. 
Dynamically adjusting the rate of decay to reflect the 
environment in which a device is being used will enable the 
model to adapt. In public, high-risk areas, a steeper rate of 
erosion could be utilized, whilst in a familiar and perceived 
low risk environment a flatter more sedate timescale 
employed. Indeed the decay space becomes a complex n-
dimensional curve with degrees of freedom including 
application sensitivity, time, location, method of 
authentication and user behavior. Consideration of these 
factors and more will dictate at what percentage point 
confidence will be at any given moment in time. 
Section III(C) builds on this approach and further 
explores how it could be used to improve security. 
C. Device interaction 
As proposed in section III(A) enabling disparate devices 
owned by the user to communicate will bring advantages in 
achieving strong methods of authentication. Additional 
identity confidence could also be obtained by gathering the 
authentication status of nearby devices. Distinct devices are 
likely to utilize different methods of authentication and using 
this array of approaches arguably establishes a more robust 
security profile. By enabling entities to recognize each other 
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likelihood that the owner has been replaced by an impostor is much less 
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and communicate their current state of user identity 
confidence, the degradation process could be slowed or even 
reversed.  
Fig. 1 below shows a conceptual diagram of the 
relationship paths that might be established by a user’s set of 
personal devices 4  and the variety of authentication 
techniques that might be employed. 
Information sharing would be carried out between trusted 
pairs via a near field communication (NFC) channel such as 
Bluetooth. Utilizing NFC will ensure the security envelope is 
restricted to the local vicinity and acquired confidence is 
confined to entities within the physical proximity of the 
requesting device. Additionally, ensuring the intra device 
trust would effectively eliminate responses from unknown 
third party entities. Without doing this, a degrading device 
might poll the surrounding near vicinity for listening pieces 
of equipment and one owned by a different user might 
respond with an assurance of confidence which although 
true, would not be in the same user’s identity. If accepted 
and permitted to proceed, the alien device would falsely 
bolster the observed identity confidence. 
Furthermore, associating a weighting tariff to the method 
of authentication would allow equipment to utilize robust 
techniques that they would otherwise not have the ability to 
use [13]. The tariff system could then be extended to either 
slow or accelerate the rate of confidence decay (see section 
III(B)). For instance, a laptop computer might have an inbuilt 
fingerprint scanner with a high tariff of robustness. The same 
 
Figure 1.  The potential intra-device relationship and authentication 
techniques for a given user 
                                                           
4 The mobile telephone is shown as centric to the scheme because of the 
likelihood that it is the one device that is ever present upon the legitimate 
user’s person. 
person’s mobile telephone might only authenticate via a PIN 
number; a far less rigorous form of authentication. Thus by 
drawing upon the laptop’s high tariff confidence, the mobile 
phone could gain an enhanced state of assurance and thereby 
extend a slower degradation than would otherwise have been 
appropriate. Introducing additional items and allowing every 
device to trade and negotiate confidence with every other 
will synthesize a flexible and self maintaining security 
environment. 
This region of localized security can also be augmented 
by constructing the system in such a way that it can be 
introduced and subsequently recognize the local 
environment. This could be achieved by sensing available 
wireless networks and associating them with locations, 
allowing degradation tariffs to be correspondingly allocated 
within an administration function. The tariffs or weightings 
associated with public spaces can be utilized to degrade 
confidence more rapidly than those linked with more private 
arenas. By integrating the ability to detect and consequently 
recognize known locales, the model will react and adapt 
independently of human intervention. Hence, as the user 
crosses environment boundaries security and awareness can 
be immediately heightened or relaxed respectively increasing 
or reducing the frequency that re-authentication is requested. 
It may even be possible to associate the user’s behavior and 
device interaction with locations or at least perceived 
security threats. That is, through use and experience each 
device might be able to recognize that the user only activates 
certain applications when at home or in equally low threat 
surroundings. Vice versa particular services or operations 
might be utilized in public areas or correspondingly high risk 
locations, allowing immediate yet discrete security 
adjustments to be made. This is achievable via the adaptation 
of behavior based identification techniques [25]. 
IV. SYSTEM ANATOMY 
Having explored the core features and requirements of 
the proposed approach to mobile device security it is now 
possible to examine and discuss in greater detail how such a 
framework could be implemented. This section addresses the 
core elements, the role each plays and how they might be 
united to achieve a robust and adaptive security system. 
The suggested system would consist of a core control 
engine with the ability to hook into and utilize five peripheral 
elements; the local environment, database storage, device 
operating system, one or more authentication mechanisms 
and the other member devices. Fig. 2 outlines how the 
elements would combine and the direction of information 
flow between the disparate parts of the anatomy. It also 
illustrates the elements that are located within the physical 
body of the device and those that lie beyond. 
Centric to each device is envisaged to be the Adaptive 
Security Control Engine (ASCE), which will manage and 
direct the internal security.  It will be required to hook into 
the device operating system in order to influence and apply 
relevant security policies based upon the action and 
authentication success of the user.  Post-initial authentication 
and the establishment of an identity confidence the ASCE  307
Figure 2.  Adaptive security environment 
will administer the degradation of confidence using the 
methodology (or similar to) outlined in subsection III(B).  
This concept of degradation will potentially be further 
influenced by the environment in which the device is being 
operated.  To achieve this, ASCE will need to utilize an 
environment-sensing module that will learn to recognize 
localities and their associated threat, and use this to affect the 
rate at which the confidence in the user's identity is being 
eroded.  As discussed earlier in this document, operating a 
laptop at home is expected to be less of a threat than using 
one whilst waiting in a public space; by adjusting the rate of 
decay accordingly, these expectations can be incorporated 
into the framework. 
Authentication, although controlled and requested by the 
ASCE, will be carried out by authentication mechanisms that 
communicate via a generic interface. This will allow the 
ASCE to be a portable concept that can be applied to many 
different types of device, making it independent of a specific 
set of hardware.  The generic approach aligns itself with the  
 
 
Figure 3.  Varying levels of device sophistication and consequent 
contribution to the authentication process. 
objectives of the BioAPI Consortium [26] which has 
specified an international standard for interfacing to 
biometric systems. Utilizing this framework and extending it 
to both biometric and non-biometric methodologies would 
enable a single engine to accept and function with a number 
of identity confirming processes. That is, a mobile phone 
should be typically capable of utilizing authentication via 
PIN, voice recognition, facial recognition or even keystroke 
analysis. One or more of these could be plugged into the 
engine facilitating the necessary provision of identity 
recognition. 
Some devices will operate a two-way interaction with 
their surrounding security counterparts; for instance a laptop 
computer will both request and provide security details. 
However, it may be possible to utilize some entities that only 
contribute by their presence, providing a form of token-based 
security. Car keys are an example of such an item;  
incorporating these so that their mere presence, indicated by 
replying to a polled request, can be used to bolster security 
confidence in the user’s identity (i.e. because the holder can 
show themselves to be in possession of a larger set of 
physical artifacts associated with the legitimate user). 
Fig. 3 above shows a succinct representation of the 
relative sophistication of devices that might be used by the 
ASCE. It can be argued that any device that can be placed on 
the scale from “Full two-way” to “Passive presence only” 
can in some way contribute to the security envelope. Thus 
this approach is ultimately flexible and scalable to a huge 
variety of devices with or without built in processing 
intelligence. 
Finally, as illustrated in Fig. 2, the ASCE will use a data 
repository to store relevant information, parameters and 
details, of its own status and other devices in the security 
partnership.  The repository is made up of a number of data 
tables that would store both persistent reference information 
and working details updated in real-time. 
 
V. DISCUSSION 
In addition to the base technological concepts there are 
other matters that will require careful consideration prior to 
implementation of the framework. Privacy and the associated 
risk of transmitting biometric template information between 
devices when one is incapable of unilaterally processing a 
sample, is such an example. Appropriate encryption and 
communication channel security will have to be employed to 
protect against eavesdropping and remove the potential for 
man-in-the-middle attacks. Introducing such protection will 
incur additional processing overheads that will impact upon 
the operational performance of the framework. 
Indeed, computational, memory, battery and network 
performance issues also demand investigation to ensure that 
the framework can be adapted to function on as many 
categories and types of device as possible. Ultimately it is 
desirable to employ the smallest footprint possible, so it is 
inevitable that there will be some element of compromise to 
avoid precluding potential technology. 
Although this paper has proposed biometrics as a suitable 
authentication candidate, it is important to note that with 
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distinct methods greatly differing levels of performance can 
be experienced. This is amplified by the need to adapt some 
biometric techniques so they can be employed in a non-
intrusive manner [9]. Designing the framework to operate 
with a plug-and-play capability will lessen some of these 
demands and enable alternatives to be used but will 
concurrently increase the complexity of the necessary 
interface.  
Trust is another major area of focus. Trust between 
devices will need to be established and at times revoked. It is 
imperative that this process correctly addresses usability and 
is implemented in a way that is logical, secure, yet easy to 
use. Aside from aesthetics, devices will also need the ability 
to receive and utilize un-trusted environmental information. 
Parsing this information correctly will enable devices to 
draw appropriate detail whist remaining secure and removed 
from threat. 
Operational thresholds for applications and device 
services are one final area that requires further investigation. 
As yet it is unclear how best to invoke them; a simple 
ranking and user selected scale may be suitable for some 
applications but for others a more complex approach 
dependent upon a number of variables might be more fitting. 
As the design of the framework evolves it is hoped that these 
factors will clarify and allow appropriate decisions to be 
taken. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
It is desirable that security and the way in which most 
users authenticate themselves with mobile devices should 
now evolve to a more holistic level. For too long 
manufacturers have had little choice but to rely upon 
password or PIN-based mechanisms to secure what are 
becoming ever more sophisticated devices, with ever 
increasing replacement and misuse costs. This paper 
suggests an approach that will allow disparate personal 
devices to trade security information and glean confidence of 
identity from their peers. It may potentially offer a way in 
which user identity can be ascertained and communicated to 
non-personal devices, supporting the interactions 
individual’s have and augmenting the safeguards that are 
currently in place. 
The ability to create a near-field security space will 
enable technologists to review device activation procedures. 
Under certain circumstances they may even be able to 
demote or possibly remove a user’s requirement to 
repetitively logon to multiple entities during successive 
activations. Further work will undertake the development of 
a prototype framework to determine the feasibility and 
working advantage of such an approach, whilst reviewing the 
perception and response of the wider user population. 
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